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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
JefferyGriggappeals from the Judgment and Commitment and Order of 
Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment. After the district court denied his 
motion to suppress, Mr. Grigg entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance. Mr. Grigg asserts that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress evidence because his right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated 
when law enforcement officers improperly seized him without reasonable suspicion, and 
as such, the evidence derived from the improper seizure must be suppressed. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns 
On October 2, 2008, an Information was filed charging Mr. Grigg with possession 
of a controlled substance. (R., pp.22-23.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Grigg filed a Motion to 
Suppress Evidence AdmissionlConfession and Notice of Hearing requesting that the 
district court suppress evidence, specifically controlled substances and paraphernalia, 
"obtained as a result of the warrantless seizure, search, and illegal detention of the 
defendant, and suppression the admissions/confessions . . . made as a result of the 
warrantless seizure, search, and illegal detention of the defendant." (R., pp.28-29.) 
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.41-43.) 
At the hearing, the district court took judicial notice of Officer Klitch's testimony at 
the preliminary hearing. (Tr.1115109, p.9, Ls.12-17.) Officer Klitch testified that he 
stopped at a park in Nampa and began to chat with some visitors to the park. 
(Tr.9125108, p.6, L.8 - p.7, L.24.) After talking to the occupants of a SUV, Officer Klitch 
approached a second car, later determined to belong to Mr. Grigg. (Tr.9125108, p.8, 
Ls.1-23.) Soon after approaching the car, Officer Klitch noticed that Mr. Grigg "had a 
white substance around his mouth which I thought was unusual. Also he had eyelid 
tremors. He had reddening of the conjunctiva of his eyes and he also had glassy 
bloodshot eyes, which through my training and experience led me to believe that the 
subject was under the influence of drugs." (Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 - p.10, L.1.) Officer 
Klitch went on to testify that in his training he learned that eyelid tremors and reddening 
of the conjunctiva were indicators of marijuana use and that glassy bloodshot eyes were 
indicative of impairment by alcohol or drugs. (Tr.9125108, p.10, L.17 - p.1 I ,  L.lO.) 
Based upon these observations, Officer Klitch ordered Mr. Grigg out of the car and 
began to investigate him for being under the influence of drugs in a public place. 
(Tr.9125108, p.1 I ,  Ls.11-19.) Following this initial detention, Mr. Grigg made admissions 
that there were illegal substances in his car and he was eventually arrested for felony 
possession of a controlled substance. (Tr.9125108, p.13, L.17 - p.14, L.5, p.20 , Ls.12- 
17.) 
Mr. Grigg testified on his own behalf at the suppression hearing. (Tr.l/15/09, 
p.14, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Grigg testified that he was parked in a park, attempting to repair in 
cigaEtte lighter so he could charge his cell phone when he was approached by a police 
officer. (Tr.1115109, p.14, L.11 - p.16, L.5.) The officer asked what he was doing and 
then requested his ID. (Tr.1115/09, p.16, Ls.23-25.) Shortly thereafter, Officer Klitch 
ordered Mr. Grigg out of the car. (Tr.1115109, p.18, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Grigg testified that 
during this initial encounter he was wearing his sunglasses and that the officer could not 
have observed his eyes. (Tr.1115/09, p.18, Ls.14-25.) 
The district court also considered the video recording of the latter portion of the 
detention, the search, and arrest. (R., p.43; Exhibit A-2.) At the hearing, defense 
counsel argued that, "Trooper Klitch was well within his rights to go up and talk to the 
defendant. Where he stepped over the line was ordering him from the vehicle based on 
the sketchy evidence that was adduced at the preliminary hearing." (Tr.1/15/09, p.29, 
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.44.) Specifically, the 
district court found that: 
This is a case in which there was a - it was approximately 5:00 or 6:00 at 
night. It was a summer evening. The sun was out. The defendant's car 
was parked in the shade at a park. 
The officer made consensual contact initially. That contact soon 
turned into an investigative detention, commonly what would fall within 
that Terry type of stop, in between an arrest and consensual contact. 
And then eventually turned into a full-blown arrest and a search. 
The primary issues addressed in this case were, one, the 
conflicting credibility of the testimony at the preliminary hearing of the 
officer, versus the defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing. 
The officer testified in the preliminary hearing, which was submitted with 
[tlhis hearing, that when he made the initial contact with the defendant, 
he observed white substance around his mouth, and the defendant had 
eye tremors, reddening of the conjunctiva of the eye and glassy, blood 
shot eyes. And based on his experience, it caused him to believe that he 
was under the influence of drugs. 
He makes reference, both on the video and in his testimony, to a 
statute that makes it a crime to be under the influence of a controlled 
substance in public. 
Now, the defendant testified under oath that he was wearing 
sunglasses at the time and that the officer could not have seen his eyes. 
Now, I looked at the video, and the car is clearly in the shade, and is 
clearly shaded at the time. The officer talks to him again on the video 
about why he came up and talked to him, and the officer goes on to 
discuss with the defendant the physical indicators, glassy, bloodshot 
eyes, eye tremor. Later the officer says again, "I saw your eyes," and 
gets to the point of "tremors when you closed you eyes," et cetera, et 
cetera. 
Although the defendant had his sunglasses hanging on his shirt, 
at no time in that discussion ever, at any time when they had that 
colloquy, was there any mention about "You couldn't have seen my eyes. 
I had sunglasses on." 
Now, why is that significant? Because it goes to the credibility of 
the witnesses here. Suddenly several months later, "I had my 
sunglasses on." I don't buy it. Credibility is an issue, and I found that 
not to be credible. 
Having noted that, that means then, that I buy the officer's 
testimony that he made the observations. Now, that's still pretty - it's not 
a significant observation, other than he did testify at the preliminary 
hearing that that was his conclusion, based on his training. And so at 
that point, the consensual contact becomes investigatory. He asked for 
his driver's license, he runs a check. At one point later he does give the 
defendant Miranda rights. 
So there was a consensual contact initially. It went into an 
investigatory detention. There was a reasonable basis for it to do so, 
based on the officer's observation. I have considered the conflicting 
testimony and looked at the video and seen clearly that the car was in 
the shade. 
And I even - I take that back. Even in the tape, in the audio, the 
videolaudio, the defendant states that he picked that spot to park his 
case and work on his cigarette lighter to get the charger to work or 
something, because - he picked it because it was shady. 
And so the whole point is that he's in the shade working on his car 
to fix his cigarette lighter to make sure it will charge up his - whatever 
device he had. And I just find the credibility of the testimony to be, no, 
he wasn't wearing his sunglasses. He was in the shade looking at the 
thing. And that the officer's testimony has credibility. 
So as the dominos go, the sequence occurred with probable 
cause, or reasonable cause for the detention, and then probable cause 
for the search. There was the automobile exception. It was parked in - 
the car was parked in a parking lot in a public park. And so that's it. I'm 
denying the motion to suppress. 
(Tr.1/16/09, p.5, L.13-p.10, L.6.) 
Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Mr. Grigg entered a conditional 
guilty plea to the charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the suppression 
motion. (R., pp.45-48, 56-57.) Mr. Grigg was sentenced to a unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed, suspended for a five year probationary term. (R., pp.63- 
66.) Mr. Grigg filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment and Commitment and 
Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment. (R., pp.67-69.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Grigg's motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Griqq's Motion To Su~press 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Grigg's right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated when 
officers illegally seized him. The State failed to meet its burden of proof, failing to show 
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Grigg. The officer could not 
seize Mr. Grigg without reasonable suspicion and, as such, the district court's order 
denying Mr. Grigg's motion to suppress should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferfy, 139 ldaho 
336, 338, 79 P.3d 157, 159 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress 
is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence 
are accepted; however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found 
are freely reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 ldaho 885, 886, 26 P.3d 1222, 1223 (2001). 
At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh 
evidence, resolve factual conflicts and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial 
court. State V. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Griqcl's Motion To Su~oress 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional 
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Nladdox, 137 ldaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The United States 
Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a 
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United 
Sfafes, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). 
1. The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Mr. G r i ~  
The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures 
applies to the seizures of persons through detentions falling short of arrest or an arrest. 
United Sfafes v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
16 (1968). When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense 
or other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, aritculable suspicion of criminal 
activity. State V. Schumacher, 136 ldaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001); Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). Although the required information leading to 
formation of reasonable suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the 
information required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere 
speculation or a hunch on the part of the police officer." Sfate v. Cerino, 141 ldaho 736, 
738, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2005). The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion 
is evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. 
Flowers, 131 ldaho at 208, 953 P.2d at 648. 
In the case at hand, the State presented only the evidence that Mr. Grigg was 
having issues with his eyes when Officer Klitch approached him. (Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 - 
p.10, L.1.) Specifically, Officer Klitch noted that, "he had eyelid tremors. He had 
reddening of the conjunctiva of his eyes and he also had glassy bloodshot eyes . . ." 
(Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 - p.10, L.I.) The officer testified that these eye problems can be 
indicative of drug use. (Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 - p.10, L.1.) 
While the district court did ultimately find that this was sufficient to provide 
reasonable suspicion, it noted that, "Now, that's still pretty - it's not a significant 
observation, other than he did testify at the preliminary hearing that that was his 
conclusion, based on his training." (Tr.1116109, p.7, Ls.22-25.) As such, the district 
court appeared to struggle with these indicators being sufficient to provide reasonable 
suspicion. 
Mr. Grigg asserts that eyelid tremors, reddening of the conjunctiva, and glassy 
bloodshot eyes are, alone, not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that an 
individual is under the influence of illegal substances. Contrary to the district court's 
ultimate finding, the State failed to provide evidence of reasonable articulable suspicion 
to detain Mr. Grigg and, therefore, all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal seizure 
of his person must be suppressed. 
2. All Evidence Collected Against Mr. Griqq Followinq The llleqal Detention 
Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. Unifed Sfates, 468 
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. Unifed States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Sfafe v. 
Bainbridge, 117 ldaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 (1990). The test is "whether, 
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is 
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting 
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, p. 221 (1959)). Suppression is required only if "the 
evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the 
government's unconstitutional conduct." State V. Wigginton, 142 ldaho 180, 184, 125 
P.3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d at 1131). 
In the case at hand, the above evidence clearly shows that Mr. Grigg was 
illegally seized without reasonable suspicion. Had Mr. Grigg not been illegally seized, 
the evidence located in the vehicle would not have been discovered. The State failed to 
meet its burden in showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, ail the evidence 
collected after the impermissible seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police 
activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Grigg respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 13" day of October, 2009. 
$0,. 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED' 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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